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1. Introduction 	The	traditional	view	in	epistemology	is	that	we	must	distinguish	between	being	rational	and	being	right	(that	is	also,	by	the	way,	the	traditional	view	about	practical	rationality).	In	his	paper	in	this	volume,	Williamson	proposes	an	alternative	view	according	to	which	only	beliefs	that	amount	to	knowledge	are	rational	(and,	thus,	no	false	belief	is	rational).	It	is	healthy	to	challenge	tradition,	in	philosophy	as	much	as	elsewhere.	But,	in	this	instance,	we	think	that	tradition	has	it	right.	In	this	paper	we	defend	our	version	of	the	traditional	view	and	argue	against	Williamson’s	alternative.	We	start	by	laying	our	cards	on	the	table	with	respect	to	a	crucial	issue.	Some	attackers	of	the	tradition	would	concede	that	rational	beliefs	can	be	false,	but	insist	that	justified	beliefs	cannot	be	false.	Anyone	who	introduces	this	distinction	between	rationality	and	justification	when	it	comes	to	belief	owes	us	an	explanation	of	the	distinction.	Williamson	himself	is	not	as	clear	as	one	would	hope	on	this	issue.	In	Williamson	(2013a),	he	characterizes	the	notion	he	is	theorizing	about	as	“strongly	externalist	justification”.	In	Cohen	and	Comesaña	(2013a),	our	reply	to	that	paper,	we	noted	that	“strongly	externalist”	is	technical	vocabulary	and,	absent	clarification	from	Williamson,	we	do	not	know	what	it	means.	In	response,	rather	than	clarifying	his	technical	terminology,	he	abandons	it,	although	it	reappears	in	the	paper	in	this	volume	not	as	a	characterization	of	the	kind	of	justification	he	is	talking	about,	but	rather	as	a	description	of	the	kind	of	account	of	justification	he	is	proposing.	This	in	itself	is	unobjectionable,	but	we	still	do	not	know	what	notion	Williamson	is	theorizing	about.	Unfortunately,	after	abandoning	his	characterization	of	his	target	as	“strongly	externalist	justification,”	Williamson	goes	on	to	characterize	his	target	simply	as	‘justification’.			In	Cohen	and	Comesaña	(2013a),	we	explained	the	problem	with	distinguishing	between	justification	and	rationality—“justification	is	relative	to	a	domain	of	normativity,	e.g.,	rational	justification,	moral	justification,	prudential	justification.”	So	rational	belief	is	itself	a	kind	of	justified	belief.	Just	as	a	moral	action	is	a	morally	justified	action,	so	a	rational	belief	is	a	rationally	justified	belief.																																																									*	Thanks	to	Julien	Dutant,	Clayton	Littlejohn,	Errol	Lord	and	Carolina	Sartorio	for	very	helpful	comments	on	previous	drafts	of	the	paper.	
So	it	makes	no	sense	to	distinguish	between	rational	belief	and	justified	belief.1	Anyone	who	distinguishes	between	rationality	and	justification	must	be	talking	about	a	different	kind	of	justification	from	rational	justification.	Some	might	here	respond	that	Williamson	is	talking	about	epistemic	justification	with	the	relevant	domain	being	epistemic	normativity.	But	as	we	pointed	out	in	our	first	paper,	“‘epistemic’	is	another	technical	expression	whose	meaning	in	this	context	would	be	quite	unclear.”2	In	his	paper	in	this	volume,	Williamson	echoes	this	thought:			 Indeed,	epistemologists	usually	explain	that	they	are	speaking	of	epistemic	rather	than	pragmatic	justification…‘Epistemic	justification’	is	manifestly	technical	terminology:	we	should	be	correspondingly	suspicious	of	claims	to	make	pre-theoretic	judgments	about	its	application…‘epistemic	justification’	itself	can	be	understood	in	a	variety	of	ways.3		We	take	this	to	show	that	one	cannot	adequately	characterize	the	target	of	one’s	theory	using	the	expression	‘epistemic	justification’.	If	all	we	know	about	a	theory	is	that	it	concerns	epistemic	justification,	we	do	not	yet	know	what	the	theory	is	about.	Thus	we	find	it	puzzling	that	Williamson	proceeds	to	classify	the	sort	of	norm	he’s	theorizing	about	as	‘epistemic’:		 The	Gettier	problem	is	most	significant	when	formulated	with	the	word	‘justified’	understood	in	something	close	to	its	usual	normative	sense…To	clarify	the	issues,	we	must	identify	the	relevant	norm(s):	in	this	case,	
epistemic	norm(s),	by	the	setup	of	the	problem.4		By	Williamson’s	own	lights,	‘epistemic’	is	a	technical	term,	understandable	in	a	variety	of	ways.	Unfortunately,	Williamson	does	not	tell	us	what	he	means	by	it.	Given	this,	we	will	interpret	Williamson	as	following	us	in	identifying	justification	with	rationality,	i.e.	rational	justification.	Our	view	is	that	a	subject	S	is	rational	in	believing	a	proposition	p	just	in	case	
S’s	evidence	sufficiently	supports	p.	We	also	think	that	a	body	of	evidence	can																																																									1	Some	may	object	that	there	is	not	some	independent	domain	of	rational	considerations	in	the	same	way	that	there	is	a	moral,	legal	or	prudential	domain.	The	considerations	relevant	to	what	is	rational	are	provided	by	the	other	domains. In	response,	we	acknowledge	it	is	an	open	question	what	kinds	of	considerations	contribute	to	the	rationality	of	belief.		While	we	strongly	doubt	that	all	the	considerations	that	together	constitute	the	rationality	of	a	belief	come	from	other	domains,	it	may	be	that,	e.g.,	prudential	considerations	can	partly	determine	whether	a	belief	is	rational.	But	even	if	true,	this	would	not	count	against	our	view	that	one	cannot	distinguish	between	rationality	and	justification,	no	more	than	one	can	distinguish	between	morality	and	justification,	or	prudence	and	justification.	And	as	we	note	below,	to	appeal	to	"epistemic	justification"	simply	muddies	the	waters	by	invoking	an	undefined	technical	term. 	2	Cohen	and	Comesaña	(2013),	p.	21.		For	more	discussion,	see	Cohen	(forthcoming)	3	Williamson,	this	volume,	p.	?	4	Williamson,	this	volume,	p.	?	(our	emphases).	
sufficiently	support	a	proposition	without	entailing	it.	Williamson’s	view,	by	contrast,	is	that	a	belief	is	rational	if	and	only	if	it	amounts	to	knowledge—a	view	which	can	be	summarized	with	the	equation	R	=	K.	It	is	tempting	to	make	the	case	for	the	possibility	of	false	rational	beliefs	by	appeal	to	radical	skeptical	scenarios:	evil	demons,	brains	in	vats,	disembodied	Cartesian	souls—take	your	pick.	We	agree	that	victims	of	radical	skeptical	scenarios	have	rational	beliefs	even	when	they	are	false.5	But	it	is	important	to	realize	that	denying	that	there	are	false	rational	beliefs	is	an	extremely	radical	position:	it	also	commits	one	to	denying	not	only	that	victims	of	skeptical	scenarios	are	rational,	but	also	to	claiming	that	everyone	is	irrational	multiple	times	a	day.	For	we	have	false	beliefs	multiple	times	a	day,	about	trivial	as	well	as	about	important	matters:	where	the	keys	are,	whose	turn	it	is	to	do	the	dishes,	what	time	it	is,	which	student	deserves	a	prize,	whom	we	should	hire,	whether	the	death	penalty	is	just…	A	philosopher	who	denies	the	possibility	of	false	rational	beliefs	is	therefore	not	just	taking	a	position	about	a	fanciful	thought	experiment—he	is	claiming	that,	for	instance,	when	your	kid	took	your	car	keys	while	you	were	showering,	you	thereby	had	an	irrational	belief	about	where	they	were.	As	we	noted,	this	result	is	strikingly	at	odds	with	our	traditional	thinking	about	rationality.		
2. From E = K to R = K? 	One	might	think,	as	Williamson	himself	suggest	in	several	places,6	that	E	=	K	gives	some	support	to	R	=	K.	We	disagree.			E	=	K	entails	that	the	subjects	in	the	good	and	bad	case	have	different	evidence.	But	even	assuming	(as	we	are	willing	to	grant)	that	rationality	is	a	matter	of	conforming	one’s	beliefs	to	one’s	evidence,	that	gives	us	little	reason	to	suppose	that	rationality	requires	different	beliefs	in	the	good	and	the	bad	case.	The	claim	that	rationality	is	a	matter	of	conforming	one’s	belief	to	one’s	evidence	is	most	plausibly	interpreted	as	a	supervenience	thesis:	there	cannot	be	a	difference	in	what	rationality	requires	without	a	difference	in	one’s	evidence	(not	all	philosophers	will	agree	with	this	kind	of	evidentialism,	but	we	are	again	happy	to	accept	it	here).	That	leaves	it	open,	of	course,	whether	differing	bodies	of	evidence	can	rationally	require	the	same	belief.	Any	view	that	doesn’t	require	maximal	evidential	support	for	rational	belief	(such	as	our	own),	will	allow	that	one	subject	can	be	rational	in	believing	p	even	though	
																																																								5	Cohen	(1984)	presents	what	has	come	to	be	called	“the	new	evil	demon	problem”	for	reliabilism,	the	topic	of	this	volume,	one	of	whose	main	premises	is	that	victims	of	skeptical	scenarios	are	rational.	Comesaña	(2002)	responds	on	behalf	of	reliabilism,	but	agrees	with	Cohen	on	the	rationality	of	victims	of	skeptical	scenarios.	6	See,	for	instance,	Williamson	(2013b),	p.	92	and	Williamson	(this	volume).	Cf.	Cohen	and	Comesaña	(2013b),	p.	410.	
another	subject	has	better	evidence	for	p.7	If	I	believe	it	is	raining	on	the	basis	of	reliable	testimony	and	you	believe	it’s	raining	because	you	are	standing	in	the	rain,	I	can	rationally	believe	it	is	raining	even	though	you	have	better	evidence	than	I	do.	In	the	same	way,	the	evidence	in	the	bad	case	can	be	sufficient	for	rational	belief,	even	though	the	evidence	in	the	good	case	is	better.	Assuming	E	=	K	does	not	constrain	what	degree	of	evidential	support	is	required	for	a	belief	to	be	rational.	Of	course,	it	is	also	compatible	with	E	=	K	that	rationality	requires	different	beliefs	in	the	good	and	the	bad	case.		But	we	see	no	argument	in	the	passage	above	from	Williamson	that	this	is	so.		 It	may	be,	as	Williamson	suggests,	that	E=K	yields	the	result	that	one	should	have	a	higher	degree	of	confidence	in	the	good	case	than	in	the	bad	case.	This	would	follow	on	the	plausible	assumption	that	degrees	of	confidence	should	be	proportional	to	degrees	of	evidential	support.	We	take	this	result	as	reason	to	be	suspicious	of	E	=	K,	which	we	here	assume	only	for	the	sake	of	argument.8	But	even	if	we	grant	that	different	degrees	of	confidence	are	rationally	required	in	the	good	and	the	bad	case,	it	doesn’t	follow	that	different	beliefs	are	rationally	required.		
3. Justifications, excuses and R = K 	Williamson	distinguishes	between	justification	and	excuses	as	follows:	A	belief	is	justified	just	in	case	it	satisfies	the	relevant	norm.	For	concreteness,	let	us	adopt	a	norm	that	both	Williamson	and	we	would	accept	(although	we	would,	of	course,	differ	in	our	respective	accounts	of	when	certain	evidence	sufficiently	supports	p):		 (E):	If	your	total	evidence	E	sufficiently	supports	p,	then	(you	ought	to)	believe	p.				This	norm	of	justification	for	belief	gives	rise	to	a	secondary	norm:		 (DE):	You	ought	to	have	a	general	disposition	to	comply	with	E.		E	also	gives	rise	to	a	tertiary	norm:		 (ODE):	You	ought	to	do	what	someone	who	complied	with	DE	would	do	in	your	situation.		For	Williamson,	only	(E)is	genuinely	and	fully	normative	(with	respect	to	the	rationality	of	belief).	For	if	you	do	not	comply	with	(E),	then	your	belief	is	not	
justified	even	if	you	comply	with	both	(DE)	and	(ODE).	However,	complying	with																																																									7	We	are	assuming	here,	following	Williamson,	that	entailment	is	the	upper	bound	of	the	support	relation,	but	this	is	controversial.	The	notion	of	entailment	is	a	logical	one,	and	its	relationship	with	normative	notions	such	as	that	of	evidential	support	is	not	straightforward.	8	See	Silins	(2005).	
(DE)	or	(ODE)	gives	you	an	excuse	for	not	complying	with	(E).	Someone	who	has	a	false	belief,	according	to	Williamson,	may	be	complying	with	(DE)	and	(ODE),	but	not	with	(E).		 What	role	does	this	distinction	between	justification	and	excuses	play	in	Williamson’s	theory?	One	relatively	clear	role	is	that	it	might	help	defuse	an	objection.	Distinguish	between	a	good	bad	case	and	a	bad	bad	case.	In	a	good	bad	case,	someone	has	a	false	belief	arrived	at	through	impeccable	reasoning	or	an	unimpeachable	experience-to-belief	transition.	In	a	bad	bad	case,	the	subject	has	a	false	belief	arrived	at	through	bad	reasoning	or	objectionable	experience-to-belief	transition.	Neither	of	them	complies	with	the	norm	to	believe	only	what	they	know,	and	so	they	are	both	unjustified.	But,	the	objection	goes,	the	subject	in	the	good	bad	case	is	rationally	better	than	the	subject	in	the	bad	bad	case.	Williamson’s	view	does	not	have	the	conceptual	resources	to	distinguish	between	them,	however,	and	so	it	is	to	that	extent	unacceptable.	Distinguishing	between	justification	and	excuses	is	a	way	of	making	conceptual	room	for	distinguishing	between	the	good	bad	case	and	the	bad	bad	case.	He	can	say	that	although	both	subjects	fail	to	comply	with	the	primary	norm	to	believe	only	what	they	know,	the	subject	in	the	good	bad	case	complies	with	the	corresponding	secondary	and	tertiary	norms,	whereas	the	subject	in	the	bad	bad	case	does	not.		 There	is	room	for	resisting	this	reply.	What	good	victims	have	in	common	with	rational	subjects,	according	to	Williamson,	is	that	they	satisfy	their	secondary	and	tertiary	obligations—but	satisfying	secondary	and	tertiary	obligations,	by	Williamson’s	own	lights,	has	nothing	to	do	with	rationality.	Williamson	sees	no	rational	difference	between	subjects	who	believe	on	the	basis	of	good	reasoning	and	subjects	whose	brains	have	been	scrambled	and	so	believe	on	the	basis	of	fallacious	reasoning:	“The	brain	scrambler	case	is	just	one	more	sceptical	scenario,	in	which	the	data	for	computation	are	interfered	with	at	a	slightly	different	point.”	But	having	your	brain	scrambled	interferes	with	your	rationality	in	a	way	in	which	undetectably	changing	your	environment	does	not.	We	are	aware	that	Williamson’s	judgment	will	differ	from	our	own	here,	but	we	see	no	argument	for	his.		Let	us	nevertheless	suppose	that	the	distinction	between	justification	and	excuses	does	give	Williamson	a	defense	from	the	objection	that	his	view	has	no	conceptual	resources	to	distinguish	between	the	bad	bad	case	and	the	good	bad	case.	Does	it	do	anything	else?	In	particular,	does	that	distinction	give	Williamson	an	argument	for	R	=	K?	He	seems	to	think	that	it	does.	The	passage	quoted	earlier	continues	as	follows:		 One	of	the	differences	between	the	two	cases	in	what	rationality	requires	might	be	that	in	the	good	case,	but	not	the	bad	case,	rationality	requires	you	to	believe	that	there	is	a	red	table	before	you.	We	must	take	such	possibilities	seriously,	not	dismiss	them	without	argument,	with	respect	to	a	norm	of	rationality	such	as	Cohen	and	Comesana’s,	since	it	is	not	of	type	[ODE].	They	fail	to	register	this	point,	because	they	take	no	account	of	normative	distinctions	like	those	explained	in	section	1.		
We	do	indeed	dismiss	those	possibilities,	but	certainly	not	without	argument.		A	cursory	glance	at	Cohen	and	Comesaña	(2013b)	will	reveal	such	an	argument	(which	we	rehearse	below).	And	contrary	to	Williamson’s	claim	that	we	take	no	account	of	the	distinction	between	justification	and	excuse,	we	say	in	that	paper:		 Excusability	and	justification	are	very	different	notions.	One’s	f-ing	is	justified	just	in	case	one’s	f-ing	meets	the	relevant	normative	standard.	One’s	
f-ing	is	excusable	only	if	one’s	f-ing	fails	to	meet	the	normative	standard,	but	in	a	blameless	manner.		While	we	do	in	fact	distinguish	between	justification	and	excusability,	we	disagree	with	Williamson	about	their	application.	He	thinks	the	subject	in	the	good	bad	case	believes	irrationally	but	blamelessly.	We	think	the	subject	in	the	good	bad	case	believes	rationally,	but	some	subjects	who	believe	irrationally	(e.g.	due	to	extreme	duress,	or	psychosis,	or	having	had	their	brains	scrambled)	are	blameless.	To	disagree	with	Williamson	about	how	to	apply	the	distinction	between	justification	and	excuse	is	not	to	fail	to	take	account	of	the	distinction.			 	Moreover,	consider	one	of	Williamson's	brain	scrambler	cases:		...	the	scrambler	causes	the	subject’s	reasoning	to	reach,	quite	fallaciously,	a	contingently	false	conclusion	which	her	evidence	tells	strongly	against	—	say,	that	most	non-Westerners	are	stupid,	or	that	this	candidate	deserves	the	job	more	than	that	one	does	—	but	which	she	thereby	comes	to	believe	without	further	reflection.	In	having	that	belief,	she	complies	with	the	norms	[DE]	and	[ODE],	for	the	same	reasons	as	before.					According	to	Williamson,	we	should	be	inclined	to	think	that	the	subject	in	this	case	
rationally	believes	that	most	non-westerners	are	stupid.	After	all,	the	subject	complies	with	ODE	and	such	compliance	is	supposed	to	be	what	leads	us	to	conclude	that	the	subject	in	the	bad	case	is	rational.		But	we	have	no	temptation	to	view	the	brain-scrambled	subject	as	rational.	After	all,	the	subject	reasons	fallaciously	and	contrary	to	her	evidence.	We	conclude,	then,	that	Williamson’s	appeal	to	the	distinction	between	justification	and	excuse	does	little	to	motivate	his	view	over	the	traditional	view	we	endorse.				
4. Unification or confusion? 	Williamson	proposes	that	his	view	has	an	advantage	over	ours	in	that	it	can	unify	what	he	calls	“objective	and	subjective”	norms	for	belief:		 [An]	advantage	of	the	present	framework	is	that	it	offers	the	prospect	of	unifying	‘objective’	and	‘subjective’	norms	for	belief.	As	most	epistemologists	
accept,	a	false	belief	is	somehow	defective.	In	particular,	the	brain	in	the	vat’s	false	beliefs	are	defective.	Their	defect	is	not	that	they	violate	a	norm	with	respect	to	which	the	good	and	bad	cases	are	equal,	for	the	subject’s	beliefs	in	the	good	case	are	by	hypothesis	not	defective.	If	the	brain	in	the	vat’s	false	beliefs	are	justified,	then	a	second	norm	is	needed	to	explain	why	their	falsity	is	a	defect.	By	contrast,	if	one	starts	with	a	truth-entailing	standard	J	for	justified	belief,	one	can	explain	directly	what	is	wrong	with	false	beliefs,	as	violations	of	that	norm,	while	still	having	the	resources	to	explain	a	corresponding	derivative	norm	ODJ,	which	the	subject’s	beliefs	comply	with	equally	in	the	good	and	bad	cases.		On	the	assumption	that	there	is	a	truth	norm	for	belief,	Williamson	claims	that	on	his	view	we	get	a	unified	account	of	the	normative	status	of	the	subjects	in	the	good	and	bad	case.	The	subject	in	the	good	case	satisfies	the	norm	for	rationality.	The	subject	in	the	bad	case	fails	to	satisfy	the	primary	norm	for	rationality,	but	instead	satisfies	the	derivative	ODE	norm.	So	Williamson	can,	with	his	single	truth-entailing	norm,	explain	both	why	false	beliefs	are	defective,	and	what’s	good	about	the	subject’s	beliefs	in	the	bad	case.	Our	non-truth-entailing	norm	explains	why	the	subject	is	rational	in	the	bad	case—he	is	believing	what	his	evidence	supports.	But	we	require	an	additional	norm	to	explain	what’s	defective	about	false	beliefs,	i.e.	what’s	good	about	the	good	case.		 But	a	unifying	account	of	distinct	phenomena	is	desirable	only	if	the	phenomena	are	related	in	the	right	way.	Consider	the	racist	belief	that	white	people	are	superior	to	people	of	other	races.	One	might	plausibly	think	this	belief	is	also	defective,	and	not	simply	because	it	is	false,	or	irrational.	As	Williamson	allows,	such	a	belief	is	morally	defective.	Should	we	expect	an	account	of	rational	belief	to	give	a	unifying	account	of	defective	in	the	bad	case	and	the	defect	in	the	case	of	the	racist?	Because	morality	is	a	distinct	normative	domain	from	rationality	(of	belief),	any	such	“unifying”	would	be	misguided.	Far	from	counting	in	favor	of	the	theory,	this	kind	of	unifying	would	count	against	it.	With	this	in	mind,	we	can	ask	whether	the	unification	yielded	by	Williamson’s	theory	counts	in	favor	of	the	theory	or	against	it.	It	will	count	in	favor	of	the	theory	only	if	falsity	is	a	rational	defect	in	a	belief.	But	this	is	(again)	just	the	point	at	issue	between	Williamson	and	us.	On	our	view,	rather	than	providing	a	unified	account	of	related	phenomena,	Williamson	has	misguidedly	conflated	distinct	normative	domains.	One	person’s	unification	is	another	person’s	confusion.		 Additionally,	there	is	reason	to	be	suspicious	of	Williamson’s	claim	that	there	is	a	truth	norm	for	believing.	It	is	uncontroversial	that	the	correctness	condition	for	believing	is	truth.	To	believe	falsely	is	to	believe	incorrectly.	Is	correctness	normative?	While	‘normative’	is	not	used	univocally	among	philosophers,	in	Williamson’s	sense,	“a	norm…	is	anything	that	can	yield	some	sort	of	‘ought’	or		‘should’”.	But	as	Judith	Thomson	(2008)	has	noted,	correctness	conditions	do	not	by	themselves	yield	‘ought’s	or	‘should’s.	There	is	a	correct	way	to	play	Mozart’s	piano	sonata	No	16.	Suppose	a	pianist	decides	to	play	this	sonata	incorrectly—she	leaves	out	or	adds	certain	notes	because	she	is	trying	to	achieve	a	certain	artistic	effect.	It	doesn’t	follow	that	there	is	any	sense	in	which	she	ought	not	to	or	should	not	play	
the	sonata	that	way.	Moreover,	this	is	not	just	because	the	reasons	derived	from	her	trying	to	achieve	the	artistic	effect	outweigh	the	reasons	derived	from	the	correctness	conditions—there	are	no	such	reasons.	Even	if	the	pianist	incorrectly	plays	the	sonata	without	a	reason	for	doing	so,	it	might	well	be	false	that	she	ought	to	have	played	it	correctly.	One	can	be	permitted	to	do	things	incorrectly.	Of	course,	there	may	be	other	considerations	that	militate	against	her	playing	the	sonata	incorrectly.	Perhaps	it	will	upset	or	offend	people.	But	in	that	case,	it	isn’t	the	mere	incorrectness	of	the	performance	that	generates	the	‘ought’.9	Analogously,	it	is	not	obvious	to	us	that	believing	incorrectly	is	normatively	significant.	When	one	has	very	strong,	but	misleading	evidence	for	p,	one	is	permitted	(indeed,	sometimes	required)	to	believe	p,	even	though	so	believing	is	incorrect.		
5. R = K and entailing evidence 	In	Cohen	and	Comesaña	(2013a)	we	noted	that	R	=	K	conflicts	with	the	truism	that	one	can	rationally	believe	a	false	proposition.	In	Williamson	(2013b),	Williamson	defends	his	view	by	appeal	to	E	=	K	and	the	surprising	claim	that	one	rationally	believes	p	only	if	one’s	evidence	fully	supports	(entails)	p:			 …since	truths	[E	=	K	requires	evidence	to	consist	only	of	truths]	never	entail	a	falsehood,	they	never	fully	support	a	falsehood	(support	in	the	strongest	way);	they	support	it,	if	at	all,	only	partially.	Rationally	sometimes	requires	one	to	adopt	a	false	belief	only	if	it	sometimes	requires	one	to	adopt	a	belief	not	fully	supported	by	one’s	evidence.	Cohen	and	Comesana	give	no	argument	that	rationality	ever	requires	that.		Nor	is	the	equation	E	=	K	the	only	view	of	evidence	to	yield	the	point	that	one’s	evidence	never	fully	supports	a	falsehood;	any	view	of	evidence	on	which	only	truths	are	evidence	has	the	same	consequence.	For	one’s	evidence	fully	to	support	a	falsehood,	the	evidence	must	contain	falsehoods,	in	which	case	some	truths	are	
inconsistent	with	one’s	evidence:	hardly	an	attractive	view.			In	Cohen	and	Comesaña	(2013b)	we	showed	that	these	remarks	commit	Williamson	to	the	view	that	one	is	not	rationally	permitted	to	believe	p	unless	one’s	evidence	entails	p.	Exactly	how	having	entailing	evidence	relates	to	believing	rationally	is	far	from	clear	on	Williamson’s	view.	The	standard	view	is	that	whether	one	believes	p	rationally	is	explained	by	how	well	one’s	evidence	supports	p.	This	explanation	hinges	on	the	role	the	basing	relation	plays	in	rational	belief.	The	thought	is	that,	for	familiar	reasons,	evidence	E	can	explain	why	one	rationally	believes	p	only	if	one																																																									9		Similarly,	we	would	argue	against	Williamson	and	others,	there	are	no	“ludic	oughts”—‘oughts’	generated	by	the	rules	of	a	game.	If	I	castle	while	in	check,	even	in	the	absence	of	reasons	for	doing	so,	it	might	well	be	false	that	I	ought	not	have	castled.	The	rules	of	chess	do	not	give	us	reasons	to	play	chess,	and	in	the	absence	of	a	reason	for	playing	chess	there	is	no	reason	to	refrain	from	castling	while	in	check.	
believes	p	on	the	basis	of	E.	Surely	Williamson	does	not	think	that	rationality	requires	that	when	p	is	inferentially	based	on	E,	E	must	entail	p.	It	reminds	one	of	Popper’s	“solution”	to	the	problem	of	induction,	which	amounts	to	saying	that	induction	never	yields	justified	beliefs.	We	can	perhaps	discover	what	Williamson	has	in	mind	by	seeing	how	R	=	K	satisfies	the	requirement.	Given	E	=	K,	the	entailing	evidence	requirement	follows	trivially	from	R	=	K.		If	one	rationally	believes	p,	then	one	knows	p.	If	one	knows	p,	then	one	has	p	as	evidence.	Since	p	entails	p,	whenever	one	is	rational,	one	has	entailing	evidence.	Construed	this	way,	the	entailing	evidence	requirement	offers	no	support	for	R	=	K	against	our	objection	that	it	conflicts	with	a	truism.	Williamson’s	point	is	that	the	entailing	evidence	requirement	rules	out	the	possibility	of	false	rational	belief.	But	we	already	knew	from	the	factivity	of	knowledge	that	R	=	K	rules	out	false	rational	belief.	If	the	entailing	evidence	requirement	is	simply	a	consequence	of	R	=	K,	then	Williamson	is	merely	pointing	out	(in	a	less	direct	way)	that	R	=	K	has	the	objectionable	consequence	we	already	knew	it	to	have.10			
6. Against R = K 		
6.1 R = K and Inductive Inference 		Consider	good	and	bad	inductive	cases.	Suppose	Alan	wakes	up	one	morning	and	notices	that	the	ground	is	wet.	On	that	basis,	Alan	infers	that	it	rained	the	night	before.11 Bernard	wakes	up	far	away	from	Alan,	also	to	find	that	the	ground	is	wet,	and	makes	the	same	inference.	Alan	is	right:	it	rained	last	night,	and	he	comes	to	know	this	on	the	basis	of	his	inference.	Bernard	is	wrong,	though:	the	ground	is	wet	only	because	children	have	been	playing	with	hoses.	On	the	standard	view,	both	Alan’s	and	Bernard’s	beliefs	are	rational	because	they	have	the	same	sufficiently	strong	basing	evidence.	According	to	R	=	K,	however,	Alan	is	rational	but	Bernard	is	not.	How	does	Williamson	explain	the	difference?	Williamson	could	argue	that	only	Alan	has	entailing	evidence.	Given	R	=	K,	if	Alan	rationally	believes	it	rained,	then	he	knows	it	rained.	And	if	he	knows	it	rained,	it	is	part	of	his	evidence	that	it	rained.	Fair	enough.	But	as	we	noted,	on	this	way	of	arguing,	the	entailing	evidence	requirement	is	a	trivial	consequence	of	R	=	K.	It	would	be	simpler	for	Williamson	to	simply	appeal	to	R	=	K	directly	and	argue	that	Bernard	cannot	rationally	believe	it	rained	because	in	the	bad	case	it	is	false	that	it	rained.	In	the	end	Williamson	must	account	for	the	difference	between	the	inductive	good	and	bad	cases	by	noting	that	only	in	good	case	does	the	subject	know.	Of	
																																																								10	By	the	way:	for	defenses	of	the	view	that	Williamson	considers	“hardly	attractive”,	see	Comesaña	and	McGrath	(2014),	Comesaña	and	McGrath	(forthcoming),	Fantl	and	McGrath	(2009)	and	Fantl	(2015).		11	Feel	free	to	substitute	your	favorite	example	of	inductive	knowledge.	
course,	this	way	of	proceeding	is	no	more	cogent	than	the	antecedent	plausibility	of	R	=	K	itself.		A	more	difficult	problem	arises	for	Williamson	when	we	consider	that	in	addition	to	beliefs,	inferences	can	be	rational.	Standardly,	the	rationality	of	inferring	
p	is	determined	by	how	well	the	evidential	basis	for	the	inference	supports	p.12 But	the	inferences	in	the	good	and	bad	inductive	cases	have	the	same	evidential	basis.	How	does	Williamson	explain	why	the	inference	in	the	good	case	is	rational,	but	the	inference	in	the	bad	case	is	irrational?	Why	is	the	subject	in	the	good	case,	who	does	not	yet	know	p,	rationally	permitted	to	infer	p	while	the	subject	in	the	bad	case	is	not?	Williamson	could	say	that	one	can	rationally	infer	p	only	in	the	good	case,	because	only	in	the	good	case	will	one	thereby	come	to	know.	But	what,	besides	a	commitment	to	knowledge-first	ideology,	could	motivate	this	view?		Williamson	cannot	argue	that	he	is	giving	a	theory	of	rational	belief,	not	a	theory	of	rational	inference.	This	helps	R	=	K	only	if	he	can	allow	that	despite	the	fact	that	both	Alan	and	Bernard	make	rational	inferences,	only	Alan	thereby	acquires	a	rational	belief.	But	if	rational	inference	doesn’t	guarantee	rational	belief,	one	could	be	rationally	permitted	to	infer	an	irrational	belief.	It	is	hard	to	make	sense	of	that.	It	follows	that	if	Alan	is	rational	in	the	good	case,	then	so	is	Bernard	in	the	bad	case.		 Moreover,	Williamson’s	claim	that	Bernard	is	not	rational	to	believe	raises	an	important	question,	one	which	Williamson,	to	our	knowledge,	has	never	answered:	which	attitude,	if	any,	is	it	rational	for	Bernard	to	take	with	respect	to	the	proposition	in	question?	The	options	for	an	answer	are	limited:	Williamson	can	say	that	Bernard	is	rational	in	disbelieving	it,	that	Bernard	is	rational	in	suspending	judgment	with	respect	to	it,	or	that	there	is	no	attitude	that	Bernard	is	rational	in	taking	towards	it.	All	three	options	are	problematic.	It	is	easy	to	see	that	it	won’t	do	for	Williamson	to	say	that	it	would	be	rational	for	Bernard	to	disbelieve	that	it	rained.	Bernard	doesn’t	know	it	rained,	because	that	proposition	is	false,	but	neither	does	he	know	it	didn’t	rain,	because	he	has	no	evidence	for	that	proposition.	Therefore,	it	goes	as	much	against	Williamson’s	theory	to	say	that	Bernard	is	rational	in	disbelieving	the	proposition	as	it	does	to	say	that	Bernard	is	rational	in	believing	it.	Saying	that	Bernard	would	be	rational	to	suspend	judgment	in	the	proposition	that	it	rained	is	also	problematic.	Suspension	of	judgment	is	a	bona	fide	doxastic	attitude,	to	be	distinguished	from	not	having	any	attitude	at	all	towards	a	proposition.	As	such,	it	can	be	rationally	or	irrationally	held,	and	it	is	rationally	held	just	in	case	it	is	the	attitude	that	conforms	to	one’s	evidence.	But	Bernard’s	case	looks	nothing	like	paradigmatic	cases	of	suspension	of	judgment:	his	evidence	all	tells	in	favor	of	the	proposition	that	it	rained,	and	not	at	all	against	it.	We	favor	a	conception	of	suspension	of	judgment	as	the	attitude	which	is	rational	when	the	evidence	doesn’t	sufficiently	support	either	belief	or	disbelief.13	If	this	conception	is	correct,	then	Williamson	is	committed	to	saying	that	Bernard	ought	to	suspend	judgment—because	Williamson	is	committed	to	saying	that	Bernard’s	evidence																																																									12	Here	we	ignore	the	complication	that	there	may	be	defeaters	elsewhere	in	the	subjects	evidence	13	See	Comesaña	(2013).	
doesn’t	support	either	belief	or	disbelief.	But	insofar	as	Bernard’s	case	is	not	at	all	like	paradigmatic	cases	where	suspension	of	judgment	is	rational,	this	is	a	high	cost	that	Williamson	must	pay.14		Perhaps	saying	that	Bernard	is	rational	to	suspend	judgment	will	not	strike	Williamson	as	a	bullet	that	is	harder	to	bite	than	saying	that	Bernard	is	not	rational	in	believing.	It	should	so	strike	him,	however.	Suppose	that	Bernard	is	a	Williamsonian	hero—he	believes	exactly	what	Williamson’s	theory	says	he	should	believe.	So,	in	our	case,	Bernard	suspends	judgment.	But,	in	order	to	be	justified	in	suspending	judgment,	Bernard	must	suspend	judgment	on	an	adequate	basis.	What	is	the	evidential	basis	that	makes	it	rational	for	Bernard	to	suspend?	Could	Williamson	say	that	it	is	the	proposition	that	the	ground	is	wet?	Notice	what	saying	this	entails.	When	the	evidence	provides	strong	inductive	support	for	a	true	proposition,	the	rational	attitude	to	take	towards	that	true	proposition	is	belief,	whereas	where	the	evidence	provides	the	same	degree	of	inductive	support	for	a	false	proposition,	the	rational	attitude	to	take	towards	that	proposition	is	suspension	of	judgment.	But,	remember,	this	is	an	inferential	case:	the	subject’s	only	basis	for	taking	an	attitude	is	the	inductive	evidence	itself.	The	Williamsonian	hero,	then,	would	have	to	guess	whether	the	evidence	is	misleading	or	not,	and	adopt	an	attitude	on	the	basis	of	that	guess.15	Needless	to	say,	that	is	no	paragon	of	rational	activity.	Notice	that	our	objection	to	saying	that	the	rational	attitude	for	Bernard	is	to	suspend	does	not	at	all	depend	on	luminosity	considerations.	On	our	view,	as	much	as	on	Williamson’s,	it	is	possible	for	a	subject	to	lack	justification	for	belief	and	not	know	it—because,	for	instance,	she	is	mistaken	about	what	her	evidence	is.	But	this	is	not	Bernard’s	case:	his	evidence	is	the	same	as	Alan’s,	and	we	may	even	stipulate	that	he	knows	what	his	evidence	is.	When	Bernard	suspends,	then,	he	does	it	blindly—he	knows	what	evidence	he	has,	and	he	knows	that	it	would	justify	belief	where	the	belief	to	be	true.	Finally,	then,	Williamson	might	claim	that	there	is	no	attitude	that	Bernard	is	rational	in	taking	towards	p.	It	is	not	rational	for	Bernard	to	believe,	disbelieve	or	suspend	judgment.	Bernard’s	position	is	so	bad	that	not	only	does	he	have	no	clue	about	how	bad	it	is:	it	puts	him	in	an	epistemic	dilemma.	Whatever	attitude	Bernard	adopts	towards	the	proposition	in	question,	it	is	an	irrational	attitude.	But	it	is	implausible	that	there	are	any	epistemic	dilemmas	at	all.	Even	if	there	are,	it	is	implausible	that	they	are	as	pervasive	as	this	position	would	have	it.	For	remember	that	Williamson	has	to	face	this	problem	for	every	false	belief:	for	victims	of	skeptical	scenarios,	of	course,	but	also	for	people	whose	keys	are	surreptitiously	taken.	We	collectively	face	epistemic	dilemmas	multiple	times	an	hour.	(A	similar	implausibility,	by	the	way,	attaches	to	the	second	possibility:	that	of	suspending	judgment.)																																																									14	Williamson	makes	somewhat	cryptic	remarks	in	his	paper	in	this	volume	about	“Pyrrhic	skepticism”,	but	they	seem	to	point	in	the	direction	of	justifying	the	claim	that	Bernard	is	not	rational	in	suspending	judgment.	15	But	notice	that,	for	Williamson,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	misleading	evidence:	evidence	that	rationalizes	belief	in	a	false	proposition.		
Williamson	might	combine	either	of	these	two	last	views	with	the	claim	that	it	is	rational	for	Bernard	to	adopt	some	fine-grained	attitude.	Thus,	Bernard	may	be	rational	in	suspending	judgment,	or	maybe	there	is	no	rational	coarse-grained	attitude	Bernard	is	rational	in	taking,	but,	at	the	same	time,	Bernard	is	rational	in	taking	some	fine-grained	attitude	(credence)	towards	the	proposition	in	question.	Of	course,	Alan’s	rational	credence	will	be	different	than	Bernard’s,	for	Alan	has	more	evidence	for	the	proposition.	This,	again,	strikes	us	as	a	non-starter.	Whatever	it	is	rational	for	Alan	to	(intend	to)	do,	it	is	rational	for	Bernard	to	(intend	to)	do,	and	what	they	are	rational	to	do	is	in	part	a	function	of	which	attitudes	it	is	rational	for	them	to	hold	in	a	way	on	which	a	difference	in	rational	attitude	gives	raise	to	a	possible	case	of	a	difference	in	rational	action.		
6.2 R = K and practical rationality 	In	addition	to	beliefs	and	inferences,	actions	can	be	rational.	Suppose	that	both	Alan	and	Bernard	face	a	choice	that	is	p-dependent:	which	option	is	rational	depends	on	the	evidential	probability,	for	the	subject,	of	p.	The	choice	may,	of	course,	depends	on	more	things—for	instance,	on	the	subject’s	preferences.	But	a	prime	role	for	evidential	probability	is	to	encapsulate	the	subject’s	“epistemic	perspective”	on	a	choice.	Given	that	the	choice	for	Alan	and	Bernard	is	p-dependent,	and	given	that	their	evidential	probability	for	p	is	different,	it	will	of	course	be	possible	to	ascribe	to	them	a	preference	structure	such	that	taking	one	of	the	options	is	rational	for	Alan	but	not	for	Bernard.	But	suppose	Alan	and	Bernard	have	the	same	preferences	and	base	their	belief	that	p	on	the	same	evidence.		R	=	K	entails	that	a	p-dependent	choice	will	be	rational	for	one	of	them	but	not	the	other.	Williamson	will	probably	bite	the	bullet	here.	In	Williamson	(2005)	he	expresses	sympathy	for	the	following	principle:		(KPR+)	One	knows	p	iff	p	is	an	appropriate	premise	for	one’s	practical	reasoning.16		It	follows	from	KPR+	that	p	is	not	an	appropriate	premise	for	Bernard	to	use	in	practical	reasoning.	But	Bernard	is	just	as	rational	as	Alan	in	taking	p	as	an	appropriate	premise	in	practical	reasoning.	Williamson	would	have	it	that	this	claim	can	only	be	the	consequence	of	some	previous	allegiance	to	a	dubious	internalist	stance	in	epistemology,	fueled	by	a	failure	to	appreciate	the	consequences	of	content	externalism	in	the	philosophy	of	mind.	But,	if	anything,	it	is	the	other	way	around.	Judgments	about	rational	action	and	belief	are	where	the	rubber	meets	the	road	in	epistemology	and	the	theory	of	action.	We	take	it	as	a	datum	to	be	explained	that	Alan	and	Bernard	are	equally	rational	in	their	beliefs	and	actions.	That	datum	may	be	evidence	for	a	theory	of	rational	belief	and	action	that	is	internalist	in	some	sense	(although	we	suspect	that	the	terminology	of	“internalism”	and	“externalism”	is																																																									16		See	also	Hawthorne	and	Stanley	(2008)	
beginning	to	outlive	its	usefulness).	We	do	not	share	Williamson’s	optimism	about	philosophical	progress	enough	to	be	convinced	that	content	externalism	has	won	the	day	in	philosophy	of	mind	and	language,	but	(as	with	E	=	K	and	the	distinction	between	justification	and	excuses)	we	fail	to	see	an	incompatibility	between	it	and	the	claim	that	Bernard	is	rational	in	believing.	For	the	sake	of	content	externalism,	it	had	better	be	that	way.		
7. Conclusion 	We	have	argued	that	neither	E	=	K	nor	the	distinction	between	justification	and	excuses	provides	Williamson	with	a	good	argument	against	the	claim	that	being	rational	and	being	right	can	come	apart	from	each	other.	We	also	argued	against	Williamson’s	entailing	requirement	and	his	claim	that	his	view	provides	the	right	kind	of	unification	of	different	norms.	Finally,	we	also	argued	directly	against	Williamson’s	view:	it	has	unacceptable	consequences	for	inductive	inferential	justification	as	well	as	for	practical	rationality.		
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